题目：Politician tenure and banks’ non-performing loans
报告人：吴一平， 上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院
时间：2016年9月18日上午10: 30 -12: 00
地点：博萃楼阳光房
论文：学院内网
【论文摘要】This study examines the relationship between politicianintervention and banks’ non-performing loans during politician’s tenure. Weargue that politician tenure is a measure of dimension of the incentives tointervene in the local business which is determined by their perceivedpromotion probability. Using a sample of 18894 bank branches at the countylevel, we find that there is a curvilinear relationship between politiciantenure and non-performing loans (reversed U-shape). Further analysis shows thatthis curvilinear relationship is more significant for banks that are ultimatelycontrolled by the government, banks that are located in regions with severegovernment intervention, during the period after the economic stimulus packageis implemented, during the period when economic policy uncertainty is lower, and in regions wherepoliticians have stronger concerns about their careers. These results areconsistent with the view that politicians have strong incentives to use thegovernment-owned banks to promote local economic growth which is favourable totheir private goals, especially in the environment with significant governmentownership in banking system.
【报告人简介】 吴一平，经济学博士，上海财经大学讲席副教授，财政系主任。研究领域为财政政策与企业行为、政治网络的价值、政府治理等。已经在《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《经济学季刊》、《世界经济》、Emerging Markets Review、China Economic Review、Journal of Happiness Studies等中文英文重要期刊发表论文，担任经济学季刊、中国工业经济、China Economic Review、Economics of Transition、Journal of Business Ethics、Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice等中英文期刊审稿专家。先后主持国家自然科学基金面上项目、国家社会科学基金重大项目子课题、上海市哲学社会科学基金等科研项目。
